Bangladesh is one of the 11 states which abstained in voting on the United Nations (UN) Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. Th e reason as stated by the representative of Bangladesh at UN is that the term 'indigenous peoples' has not been clearly defi ned or identifi ed in the aforementioned Declaration. In fact, the government of Bangladesh has been persistently denying many of the marginal communities' claim to recognition as indigenous peoples. Th e article argues that the state of non-dominance is one of the determining criteria of the defi nitions of indigenous peoples in international law. Drawing on the discourses of subaltern historiography and internal colonialism, this article further argues that the said marginal communities of Bangladesh indeed meet all the criteria including non-dominance inasmuch as they are entitled to recognition and legal protection as indigenous peoples. Case studies on historical profi les of three marginal communities of Bangladesh are provided as factual evidence in support of the above proposition.
Introduction
Bangladesh is a multination state.
1 Th e present geographical mapping and communal matrix of Bangladesh was set largely through the dominant infl uence of British colonialism over a period of about 200 years. During the British period, many of the marginal communities of the Indian subcontinent of which a part was Bangladesh were identifi ed as tribal or aboriginal populations.
2 Towards the * ) LLM in International Legal Studies (NYU). Th e author would like to thank S.M. Aslam for his valuable research assistance. Th e author is also grateful to M. Badiuzzaman and A.R.M. Khalid for their constant encouragement and support. 1) See W. Kymlicka , Multicultural Citizenship (Oxford University Press, New York, 1996) p. 11. 2) In general, these communities are ethnically distinct, numerically inferior and politically insignifi cant than the majority populations. Hereinafter, I shall refer to them as marginal communities. As we will see, some of these communities might have possessed the attributes of nationhood at the time of colonial conquest. In this article I have used the terms 'people', 'peoples', 'communities' and 'groups' interchangeably and without assigning any legal implications.
end of the British colonial period, religious communalism turned into a predominant factor in the national politics of the subcontinent, 3 and after the promulgation of Lahore Resolution by Muslim League in 1940, the whole subcontinent split up into two political camps under the banner of Hindu and Muslim. 4 Th e marginal communities which were not of dominant religions and cultures remained relatively insignifi cant in the mainstream national politics. Th e overarching dominance of religious communalism in politics made it impossible for these communities to espouse their own political cause. 5 Consequently, in 1947 when the Indian subcontinent was partitioned into two separate nation-states, namely India and Pakistan, these marginal communities fell within each state's boundary giving rise to the dichotomy of state boundary and nation boundary. 6 In the process of partition, the province of Bengal Presidency was also divided: two-thirds of it joined Pakistan and the remaining one-third joined India. 7 From 1948 onwards, a kind of secular political movement, chiefl y built around the Bengali language movement of 1952, 8 began to crystallize in East-Pakistan, which in the long run marked the threshold of independence under the leadership of Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. 9 In 1971 the province of East Pakistan 3) D . Page , Prelude to Partition (Oxford University Press, Delhi, paperback 1999) p. 73. Page noted: "After the introduction of the Reforms, however, and particularly after the subsidence of Khilafat and non-co-operation movements, communal unity gave way to communal antagonism, the fraternization of 1919 seemed an aberration, and many parts of North India were plunged into scenes of bloodshed and strife which were to have no parallel until Partition itself." 4) Th e third paragraph of the fi rst resolution at Lahore reads as follows: "Th at it is the considered view of the Session of the All-India Muslim League that no constitutional plan would be workable in this country or acceptable to the Muslims unless it is designed on the following basic principles, viz., that geographically contiguous units are demarcated into regions which should be constituted, with such territorial readjustments as may be necessary, that the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in a majority as in the North-Western and Eastern zones of India, should be grouped to constitute Independent States in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign." For a detailed account of the situation in the aftermath of the Lahore Resolution, see 10 Th ough ILO Convention No. 107 was ratifi ed prior to the adoption of the Constitution of Bangladesh, no provision has been incorporated in the Constitution recognizing any of the marginal communities as indigenous peoples. In eff ect, the marginal communities have remained missing factors in the politics of Bangladesh which simply has renewed their identity as marginalized peoples.
11 Th e Constitution as a solemn expression of Bengali nationalism has ipso facto sought to impose the same on the marginal communities, again giving rise to the dichotomy of state boundary and nation boundary.
12 At present, there are more than 30 marginal communities in Bangladesh who are offi cially recognized as tribal populations.
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Bangladesh is one of the 11 states which abstained in the voting on the United Nations (UN) Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. Th e reason as has been expressed by the representative of Bangladesh is that indigenous peoples have not been defi ned or identifi ed in clear terms in the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.
14 Till today, Bangladesh has not recognized any of the marginal communities as indigenous peoples.
15 Th e approach of Bangladesh in relation to its marginal communities is indicative of a typical Asian attitude.
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Th e position of Bangladesh in this regard represents a kind of ambivalence and inconsistency in policy and action. For example, though Bangladesh has frequently expressed that defi nition is required for safeguarding the rights of indigenous peoples, 17 it has further proposed to replace the term 'indigenous' with something more suitable. 18 In contrast to her proposition that the situation concerning indigenous peoples should not be regarded as confi ned to Native American Stereotype only, 19 Bangladesh has not accorded the status of indigenous peoples to any of her marginal communities who inevitably do not match with the Native American Stereotype. In addition, Bangladesh has stated that the term 'indigenous peoples' was not applicable to her since the entire population had been living on the land for the past several millennia, making everyone indigenous to the land. 20 Th e majority populations of Bangladesh trace their ancestry back thousands of years; however some ethnic groups of tribal origin live in the country's south-eastern hill districts who are distinct from the mainstream population.
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On another occasion, Bangladesh has stated that the entire 120 million population of Bangladesh are all indigenous. 22 Despite the above statements, it is not impossible to discover the actual stance of Bangladesh on the indigenous issue. Bangladesh follows a highly integrationist domestic policy with regard to all of the marginal communities including those who claim that they are rightfully entitled to the status of indigenous peoples. 23 In sum, Bangladesh thinks that since her entire populations are indigenous, there is no moral or political justification to accord such special legal status to any particular section of its populations against the majority Bengalis.
Nevertheless, the marginal communities of Bangladesh have stressed the need for offi cial recognition as indigenous peoples. 24 Th ey have also emphasized the importance of recognition of their right to land and control over natural resources. 25 development issues related to use of land despite the signing of an agreement with the government. 26 Th ey have pointed out the fact of expulsion and displacement of thousands of indigenous peoples as a result of government-sponsored settlement programmes into the indigenous regions.
27 Th e indigenous peoples have brought to notice that little had been done in the past years to improve the condition of health and sanitation. 28 Against the above background, this article takes the view that the international concept of indigenous peoples has already been suffi ciently crystallized through international treaties, UN practices, organizational activities, etc. to the extent of universal application. Many of the marginal communities of Bangladesh meet the requirements of the international legal concept of indigenous peoples inasmuch as they are entitled to recognition as indigenous peoples. We shall argue that nondominance or subordination is an imperative criterion of the international legal defi nition of indigenous peoples. Th e state of non-dominance of the indigenous peoples began with classical colonialism and further continued at the hands of nation states after decolonization had taken place. We shall take help from the discourses on subaltern historiography to elaborate on the aspect of non-dominance of the marginal communities in the Indian subcontinent vis-à-vis Bangladesh. Th ereafter, case studies on the historical profi les of three marginal communities will be presented as factual evidence in support of the above propositions. Th us we shall argue that the claim of the marginal communities in Bangladesh to the status of indigenous peoples cannot be defeated on the ground of a lacking or unclear defi nition or for the excuse that the entire populations of Bangladesh are indigenous.
Defi ning Indigenous: Th e State of Non-dominance
Th ere has been heated debate over the international legal defi nitions of indigenous peoples in the preceding years because neither the indigenous peoples nor the state parties are satisfi ed with the international legal defi nitions of indigenous peoples. 29 On top of that, the indigenous peoples have preferred self-identifi cation 30 and denied any need for defi nition. However, it has been contended that self-identifi cation could not be reserved as an exclusive right of 35 ) Th e ILO Convention No. 107 defi nes indigenous peoples as "members of tribal or semi-tribal populations in independent countries which are regarded as indigenous on account of their descent from the populations which inhabited the country, or a geographical region to which the country belongs, at the time of conquest or colonisation and which, irrespective of their legal status, live more in conformity with the social, economic and cultural institutions of that time than with the institutions of the nation to which they belong". It may be noted that according to ILO 169 are "peoples in independent countries who are regarded as indigenous on account of their descent from the populations which inhabited the country, or a geographical region to which the country belongs, at the time of conquest or colonisation or the establishment of present state boundaries and who, irrespective of their legal status, retain some or all of their social, economic, cultural and political institutions". indigenous peoples at the international level and with regard to situations in Africa and Asia and it could create very serious conceptual and practical problems. 31 For instance, Bangladesh has stated that a procedure based on selfidentifi cation could be self-defeating and the agenda for indigenous people should not be allowed to be confused with the agenda of other sub-national and tribal groups that constituted minorities within their respective countries.
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Th e position of Bangladesh in relation to the defi nition of indigenous peoples at international level represents a positivist approach which treats indigenous peoples as a legal category requiring precise defi nition on the basis of which it should be possible to determine who are or who are not indigenous peoples. 38 Both of the ILO conventions specify that indigenous peoples are descendents from earlier populations in a country or a geographical region. As regards the defi nitional standpoint, however, the international approach including that of the United Nations seems to be highly infl uenced by the seminal work of UN Rapporteur J. Martinez-Cobo. His "Study of the Problem of Discrimination against Indigenous Populations" contains the most notable exposition of the concept of indigenous peoples. Cobo's defi nition presupposes the historical event of a community suff ering invasion or colonization, selfidentifi cation as distinct community, non-dominant status and determination to preserve ancestral land as the desiderata of the indigenous peoples.
39 Th e concept of indigenous peoples developed by Mrs. Erica-Irene A. Daes, the Chairperson-Rapporteur of the UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations, seems to be also based on the Cobo defi nition. Th e Working Paper on the Concept of Indigenous Peoples includes the following criteria as defi nitional factors, such as: (a) priority in time, with respect to the occupation and use of a specifi c territory; (b) the voluntary perpetuation of cultural distinctiveness;(c) self-identifi cation, as well as recognition by other groups, or by state authorities, as a distinct collectivity; and (d) an experience of subjugation, marginalization, dispossession, exclusion or discrimination. . Of them the fi rst three elements deal with the inseparable attributes concerned to the existence of indigenous peoples. Colonialism is the catalyst which reconciles between the fi rst three elements and the last one. Th e fi rst three elements have a mixed historic, economic and cultural overtone. Th e very last element, namely non-dominance, constitutes justifi cation for recognition of the legal rights of indigenous peoples.
45 Th e simple reasoning is that no entrenchment of indigenous peoples' rights would be necessary had there been no incidences of subordination of the indigenous peoples at the hands of a dominant social or political formation. A deep structured reading of the above elements will show that the fi rst three of the abovementioned elements are ineluctable desiderata for indigenous peoples. Th ough it is desirable for the indigenous peoples to conserve these elements, they have been unable to do so because of their non-dominant position which they have been experiencing since colonialism. Entrenchment of legal rights is necessary in order to enable the indigenous peoples to overcome the state of nondominance for the purpose of conserving the abovementioned elements.
As argued earlier, non-dominance constitutes one of the most important elements of the concept of indigenous peoples. Th e state of subordination of the indigenous peoples is invariably associated with colonialism as its resultant consequence. Indigenous peoples all over the world have not only been conquered by colonial powers but also found their way of life assaulted and disrupted. 46 Colonialism aff ected indigenous peoples in a number of ways such as demographic deterioration, enslavement, punishment for resistance, warfare, malnutrition due to destruction of the natural environment or over-exploitation of land and labour, disease and outright extermination. 47 peoples, apart from all its possible legal signifi cances, implies reaction and resistance to colonial domination as well as 'primitivization' of the native peoples.
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Historic injustice 49 which is invoked as providing a contextual basis for the concept itself in reality is thought to have stemmed more from the thoughts of the colonizers than the muzzles of guns. 50 Th erefore, the cultural or ideological aspect of colonial domination cannot be disregarded in order for an appropriate understanding of the magnitude of non-dominance of the indigenous peoples. However, the contemporary paradigm of non-dominance of the indigenous peoples cannot be fully conceived without the knowledge of internal colonialism.
51 Th e subordination of the indigenous peoples began with classical European colonialism. Th e historic injustice suff ered by the indigenous peoples did not really end with the demise of classical colonialism and subsequent emergence of nation states. 52 It should be mentioned that while state sovereignty over distant or external colonial territories was eroding, it remained relatively unchanged in relation to the indigenous groups and worked to keep them outside the realm of international concern. 53 With regard to customary laws not being reinstated after decolonisation, land being expropriated by the dominant groups, indigenous languages not used in schools, the situations of concern to indigenous peoples in the decolonized states are identical to those of the indigenous peoples of other regions. 54 Indigenous peoples who were subjected to classical colonialism continue to suff er from internal colonialism within the nation-states. 55 Th e basic feature of internal colonialism is that the more developed core of a country dominates the periphery politically and exploits it materially. 56 Internal colonialism resembles colonial domination because the groups who dominate the peoples on the periphery belong to a diff erent culture and the domination is based on racism.
57 Internal colonialism condemns the peoples of the periphery to an instrumental role and legalizes metropolitan hegemony. Th e typical consequences of internal colonialism include inequitable distribution of national wealth, employment and educational opportunities. Th e local resources and income are used primarily to serve the interests of the dominant ethnic or religious groups wielding state power. 58 Particularly indigenous peoples that were once externally colonized have continued to live on the periphery in the nation-states. Internal colonialism like classical colonialism is responsible for causing a number of factors like numeric inadequacy, economic and political subordination, etc. which brought about the present state of non-dominance of the indigenous peoples.
Th e state of indigenous peoples as non-dominant sectors of society refl ects the general experience of most indigenous peoples all over the world. 59 Nondominance appears to exert adverse impact on the general attributes of the existence of the indigenous peoples. For example, the resultant eff ect of non-dominance with regard to prior inhabitation is expulsion, extermination, enslavement, etc. In the same way, when connected with special attachment to land, subordination brings about dispossession, 60 and when connected with distinctive society and culture results in racial discrimination or loss of identity. Th ough it has been contended that a particular group does not cease to be indigenous as soon as it is stripped of its state of non-dominance, 61 it nevertheless constitutes a determining factor for recognizing the status of a group as indigenous peoples. For example, the majority Bengali population having been organized into a state is no more in need of the status of indigenous peoples. On the other hand, the Chakma peoples of Chittagong Hill Tracts in Bangladesh conform to the defi nitional elements of indigenous peoples including non-dominance. At present they are bargaining with Bangladesh on the status and rights of the indigenous peoples. If the Chakma can organize themselves into a state, they will no longer be in need of such recognition from Bangladesh. 62 As a matter of fact, the reality of indigenous peoples implies an asymmetric relationship between the indigenous and the state. Th e indigenous peoples could neither be eff ectively integrated into the state without losing identity nor are they able to be organized into new states.
63 Th e international legal concept of indigenous peoples has opened an alternative avenue for the indigenous peoples to realize their cultural and political rights perhaps without having recourse to either of the above options.
Indigenous Peoples in Subaltern History
In his celebrated discourse, Notes on Italian History , Antonio Gramsci has analyzed the political formation and development of the modern state in Italy in terms of a binary relationship of two classes of actors, namely the ruling class or the elite class and the subaltern class.
64 Th e history of the ruling class is essentially the history of the state and their historical unity is realized in the state. Th e supremacy of the ruling class entails two essential characteristics which are domination and intellectual and moral leadership. On the other hand, the subaltern classes are not unifi ed and cannot unite until they are able to become a state. Th ough a tendency to unifi cation exists among subaltern classes, such an attempt is continually interrupted by the ruling class. According to Gramsci, people belonging to a subaltern class are always subject to the activity of the ruling class. Consequently, the history of subaltern social classes is necessarily fragmented and episodic.
65 Th e term subaltern class appeared in the historiography of India with a newer dimension nearly two and a half decades ago. 66 Th ough the word subaltern actually means inferior rank in army, it purports, according to the subaltern school of historiography, a general attribute of subordination in South Asian society including class, caste, age, gender and offi ce or any other way. 67 Subordinate or subordination was understood in terms of a binary relationship the other counterpart of which is dominant or domination. 68 Th e term 'elite' has been used to signify the dominant groups. Th e social groups and elements included in the term 'subaltern' represent the demographic diff erence between the total population and all those who are known as elites. 69 Th e word 'subaltern' was conceived in a variable sense. 70 It includes classes of peoples who belong to non-dominant position in society and state. Th erefore, subaltern historiography is opposed to elitist historiography of the colonialist or the neocolonialist type. In the context of the above theoretical background, the historians belonging to the subaltern school have found no diffi culty to include in the subaltern class the marginal communities now aspiring to the status of indigenous peoples. Th ey have written extensively on the plight of the marginal communities under colonial rule as well as that of nation-states. 78) About the process of becoming a labourer from raiding hill-men Kaushik Ghosh remarked: "All the specifi cities of language, of religion, of proud histories of autonomy from sedentary states; all that was wiped out rapidly and was replaced by a monolithic identity beaten out from the labour contracts…Th e transformation of the primitive terror of the raiding hill-man into the docility Th e historians of the subaltern school have meticulously pinpointed the various modes of interaction between empire and the native marginal communities who were primarily aff ected by British colonization in India to the detriment of their political power, land tenures, cultural distinctiveness, economy, etc.
72 Since the beginning of colonial subjugation, the British government had recourse to a number of novel land revenue experiments which produced an unprecedented agrarian crisis in Bengal. 73 Property was created in land, leading to the growth of the market for land and the money lending business.
74 Th e recording of rights and the induction into a modern and streamlined revenue system came as a complete novelty to the marginal communities.
75 Th e introduction of an exotic and unprecedented land tenure system in the colonized territory caused dispossession of many tenants, chiefs and headmen belonging to marginal communities. 76 Colonial capitalism along with alien traders, landlords and colonial administrators was able to control the land and other resources in the territory inhabited by the marginal communities. Furthermore, the entire economic system in BritishIndia was backed up by a superimposed legal system and a powerful army. As a result, dispossession increased and traditional rights over land had diminished to the extent of giving rise to rebellions among the marginal communities. 77 Many of the marginal communities who had once been politically autonomous lost their autonomy which they exercised at the time of initial colonization. In many cases, these peoples were compelled to change their occupations and became labourers under the auspices of colonial administration.
78 Th e destruction of the of the Dhangar proto-wage-labourer contained the logic of the civilizing mission of colonial capitalism." Ghosh, supra note 71, p. 18. 79) Kaviraj, supra note 73, p. 114.
existing agrarian structure most adversely aff ected the life of the marginal communities. Th ey became the victim of two-fold oppression -feudal and colonial.
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In eff ect subaltern historiography has captured the broad picture of colonial law and politics which were imposed on the marginal communities bringing about acute subordination. Th us many aspects concerned with historic injustices suffered by the marginal communities, for example, colonial domination, attachment to land, state of non-dominance, cultural and racial distinctiveness, have become subject matters of subaltern historiography. Subaltern historiography has elaborated on the relationship between the dominant and the non-dominant to the extent that it justifi es legal recognition of the marginal communities. Th e marginal communities who aspire to the status of indigenous peoples in Bangladesh belonged to the non-dominant class as against the British colonialists. At present, they still belong to the non-dominant class as against the majority Bengali populations although colonial domination had ended long ago. In the above circumstances, what we owe to subaltern historiography is the insight that 'the non-dominant' are very much on unequal terms with 'the dominant' in respect of social, political or economic aspects of life. Th e statement of Bangladesh that the total populations of Bangladesh are all indigenous is simply fallacious. Th is very statement which purports to deny the claims of the marginal communities to the rights and status of indigenous peoples on the excuse of unreal equality represents the discriminatory approach of the state.
Th e Profi led Communities
Earlier we have argued that non-dominance or subordination is an imperative criterion in relation to the concept of indigenous peoples. In addition, subaltern historiography has provided us with an outline as to how the marginal communities in this region have been suff ering from subordination at the hands of dominant groups who are racially and culturally diff erent from them. In this part we shall discuss the historical profi les of three marginal communities of Bangladesh as factual evidence of historic injustice suff ered by them. Th ey are the Khasi, the Chakma and the Santal.
Th e Khasis
Th e general assumption is that the Khasi belonged to a section of Austric people known as T'sin-Taing or T'sin-tien or Synteng who together with Jaintia and Kha-Chai or Khasia migrated from China in the pre-historic period. 80 Some scholars are of the opinion that the ancient Khasi peoples had pioneered rice cultivation in Vietnam's Red River delta, and when conquered by the Vietnamese, they moved into Yunnan (China), and across northern Burma entered Assam, Sylhet and the Gangage basin. 81 However, the Khasi had established settlement in the 'Khasia' and 'Jaintia' hills. Later this settlement became a kingdom known as 'Jaintia' having an elected chief or Raja (King) from the Jaintia group. Besides the Jaintia hills, the Jaintia kingdom comprised some portion of the Meghalaya district and Nowgong district of Assam and had its capital at Jaintipur in Jaintia Parganas of the Sylhet district of Bangladesh. 82 According to the earliest survey-map prepared under Major James Rennel in 1777, the Khasi were in virtual possession of a considerable area of 485 square miles between the foot of the hills and the river Surma. 83 With the help of historical and non-historical data, it is possible to provide the history of the area now called Sylhet district from the seventh century AD. 84 It is known from the records of the East India Company that Jaintia kingdom was never conquered by the Muslim rulers and the Khasi had dominated areas now falling into Sylhet district until conquered by the British in 1835. 85 From 1783 to 1790 many military expeditions were launched in order to drive the Khasi out of their plain-land possession into the hills. 86 In 1789 Mr. 93 Th e British land administration system was diff erent from that of Jaintia. It was reported that land revenue in former Jaintia was paid in kind or labour, fees were levied on appointments, or ghats, bazars and fi sheries, an item which was said to bring in about RS 8,800 per annum. Other sources of revenue included monopolies, presents and fi nes. Th e total net income of Raja was estimated at from RS 25,000 to 30,000 per annum, and to this must be added the amount required to satisfy the demands of the subordinate offi cers through whose hands it passed. Rizvi Bengal, and by 1800 the company could have driven away the Khasi from the undefi ned lowland of the Surma basin either by diplomacy or by military invasions. 89 In 1824, at the beginning of Burmese war the Company entered into an agreement with the then Jaintia Raja promising that the independence of his kingdom would be maintained. 90 Despite the above agreement, the East India Company fi nally annexed Jaintia kingdom in 1835.
91 Th e Jaintia Raja was taken to Sylhet as a prisoner and later pensioned off . 92 Th ereafter, the Company replaced the earlier land administration and revenue system of Jaintia kingdom. 93 From 1835 until 1947 the agricultural lands of the former Jaintia kingdom were settled as temporarily settled estates.
94 From 1836 to 1892 six land settlements were held, of which the fi rst was conducted by Captain Fisher who set the assessment of RS 35,988 for one year.
95 Th e second survey and settlement was carried out by Lieutenant Th uiller in 1838, which actually continued up to 1840. During the second survey, Lieutenant Th uiller brought most of the rent-free estates under the revenue system. 96 From the year 1836 to 1897, the amount of assessment was raised up to RS 221,728. Meanwhile in 1853 in a report Mr. Mills made a proposal for levying house-tax and establishing a police station. In 1856, there was an attempt on the Company's behalf to collect taxes from the hilly areas. In 1860 the colonial authority imposed house-tax which gave rise to an uprising among the Khasi peoples.
97 Th e British authorities again took steps to impose income tax, which caused another great uprising among the Khasi under the leadership of U-Kiang Nongbah. 98 He demanded that there be no taxation and interference with traditional religious rites, the Jaintia Raja be reinstated, the troops and police be withdrawn.
99 U-Kiang was arrested and executed in 1862. However, 100) Ibid . 101) Wild tea was found in Surma basin around 1855 and the fi rst tea garden was established in 1857. By 1903 there had been 143 tea gardens in greater Sylhet and by 1910 there had been 11 tea gardens in Jaintia. Th e British tea-plantation ventures absorbed a lot of tribal people as labourers in tea gardens. In 1871 more than 38,000 workers were being migrated from the lower plains of WestBengal to work in tea gardens. In 1890, about 71,950 workers were being migrated to tea gardens and in the next ten years the number of migrant workers doubled. Th is Labour Importation Policy served the British Empire in two ways-fi rstly, it helped to supply labourers at the tea plantations at a very low cost, and, secondly, in this way a mixed community was created to check any future uprising of the local indigenous people against the British Empire. Rizvi, supra note 80 , pp. 
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Th e abovementioned tax regime, as it may be discerned, brought about devastating consequence for the Khasi peoples. Th e Khasi had been gradually divested of plain land formerly held in their possession and concentrated in hilly areas. Th e British economic ventures, namely the establishment of tea estates, intensifi ed the dispossession. 101 Due to colonial rule the district which once upon a time was mostly inhabited by the Khasi peoples became a Bengali Muslim populated area.
102 Th e result of the forcible purge of the Khasi from plain land of Sylhet was the following: "tracts of land north of the Surma formerly owned by Khasis and Bengali Khasis, had been occupied by Bengali cultivators, who '[had] become very willing and eager to enter into regular engagements to pay Revenue'". 103 Th us the Khasi became offi cial aliens, disallowed from participating fully in what became for the fi rst time a defi nitively Bengali agrarian territory. Th e fi rst boundary of Bangladesh defi ned Sylhet as a Bengali territory in British-India where alien Khasis might live and work but could never really belong. 
Th e Chakma
Th e origin of the Chakma peoples and the Muslim names of the Chakma chiefs of 18th century has been a matter of debate among scholars for many years.
Some of the authors suggest that the origin of the tribe should be sought in the regions of Indo-China and Th ailand, and not in the Gangage basin. 106 In spite of the irreconcilable controversy regarding origin, most of the writers are of the opinion that the Chakma had migrated from Arakan. 107 It deserves mention that the district of greater Chittagong including the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) constituted part of Arakan from 1459 until conquered by the Mughal governor Shaista Khan in 1666. 108 In Mughal revenue parlance, the CHT was known as kapash mahal or cotton estate. Except for collecting the fi xed amount of cotton, the Mughals hardly interfered in the hill people's internal aff airs. 109 According to Chakma legend, their ancestors were Kshatriyas (Warrior dynasty) of North Indian origin, who invaded Arakan towards the end of the 14th century, settled there and intermarried with the local people. 110 According to the history of Arakan, a Chakma chief left Arakan and settled at Ali Kadam during the 15th century. 111 In 1434-1435 the Chakma had put up a strong resistance on behalf of Muslims when the then Arakanese king Meng Khari in a military campaign proceeded up to Ramu. However, the Chakma were full-scale military expeditions under the command of British offi cers were sent against the rebels but failed. 123 In 1782 Sher Daulat Khan died; however his son Jan Baksh Khan and his retainer Ranu Khan continued with the resistance.
124 Th e Chakma resistance fi nally ended in 1786. In 1787 Jan Baksh Khan accepted British suzerainty and agreed to pay cotton tribute on a regular basis in return for the right to trade with the peoples of the plains. 125 In 1791 the cotton tax was abolished in favour of cash payment. Upon the death of Dharam Baksh Khan , the estate came under the Court of Wards, Chittagong in 1830. In 1855 Kaleendi Rani was declared Sarbarakar (tax collector) of the Kapas Mahal.
126 Although Kaleendi Rani was serious about getting recognition of proprietary right in land, the right to permanent settlement was never recognized by the government.
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Th e autonomy of the hill peoples was preserved until 1860. By the Act XXI of 1860, the CHT was made into a separate district and placed under the administration of a Superintendent of the Hill Tribes.
128 Th e colonial government proclaimed ownership of land in 1868.
129 Th e Chittagong Hill Tracts Regulation of 1900 (popularly known as the CHT Manual) came into eff ect on 1 May 1900. Th e CHT Manual confi rmed territorial division under three revenue circles, namely the Chakma Circle, Bohmang Circle and the Mong Circle.
130 Th e Government of India Act, 1935 designated CHT as a 'Totally Excluded Area'.
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In 1947, the Bengal Boundary Commission awarded CHT to Pakistan.
132 Th e 1956 Constitution of Pakistan retained the status of CHT as 'Totally Excluded Area'. Th is status of CHT was changed in the 1962 Constitution, providing for the appellation of 'Tribal Area' instead, but fi nally repealed in 1964. 133 During the Pakistan era, the construction of Kaptai Dam (1957 Dam ( -1962 ) devastated a nearly 400 square mile area including 54,000 acres of cultivable land. 134 According to revenue records and census fi gures, no less than 80,000 people of whom most were Chakmas became displaced due to the Kaptai Dam project. 135 In 1972, soon after Bangladesh had become an independent state, Mr. Manobendra N. Larma set forth four demands for the hill people of CHT including autonomy for CHT with its own legislature. 136 As these demands were rejected, Larma formed a political party called Parbattya Chattagram Jana Sanghati Samity (JSS). 137 After the assassination of Prime Minister Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in 1975, Larma went underground and organized Shanti Bahini (SB) as the military wing of JSS. 138 Th e CHT Manual was amended in 1979, abolishing restriction on settlement of outsiders in CHT region. Since then, thousands of Bengali settlers were brought into this region under a government-sponsored settlement programme causing further displacement of the local communities. 139 In the backdrop of military oppressions, armed confl ict ensued between SB and Bangladesh's armed forces. After two decades of unrest, a formal peace treaty was signed between JSS and the then prime minister of Bangladesh on 2 December 1997. 
Th e Santal
Th e Santal are regarded as the earliest inhabitants of the Indian sub-continent. 141 From the racial point of view, they are Dravidian. 142 In Bangladesh the Santal habitations are mainly located in the Barind region which is comprised of the Dinajpur, Rajshahi, Bogra and Chapai Nawabganj districts. Edward Tuite Dalton, one of the earliest ethnographers of British India, located the Santal settlements as follows: "in a strip of Bengal extending for about 350 miles from the Ganges to the Baitarani, bisected by the meridian of Bhagalpur or 87° east longitude, and comprising the following districts -Bhagalpur, Th e Santal Parganas, Birbhum, Bankura, Hazaribagh, Manbhum, Midnapore, Singbhum, Mayurbhanj and Balasore". 143 Th e language spoken by the Santal people is known as 'Santali'. Linguistically Santali belongs to the Kolarian family of language. 144 Except for the notes taken by the early British ethnographers, there is no manuscript of Santal history before the 18th century. Th e Santals began to settle in the place named 'Daman-i-koh' between 1790 and 1810. 145 Prior to that, they had been living in Birbhum district. From the unpublished manuscript of Buchanan Hamilton it appears that a number of Santals had settled in Dumka subdivision by 1809. 146 Between 1815 and 1830 there had been a further spread of the Santal settlement. In 1818, the Santals were found engaged in clearing forest in Godda subdivision. By 1827 many of them had settled in the extreme north of the same subdivision. In the course of time, Daman-i-koh became the abode of the Santal people. 147 In 1837 Mr. Pontet was placed in charge of its revenue administration under the title of Superintendent of the Daman-i-koh. 148 However, the imposition of increased rent by the colonial government, oppression of the Hindu money-lenders and landlords, forced labour by the European railway contractors and the derogation of the rights of Manjhi (Santal headman) occasioned grievances among the Santals. 149 Th ey tried to inform the British Administration of their miseries. Th ey even petitioned the Chief Divisional Commissioner, but all the eff orts they made were in vain as their miseries were not of much importance to the British Administration. 150 Consequently, the Santals of Daman-i-koh and the adjoining districts in alliance with other marginal communities (such as the Domes, the Bauris, the Lohars, the Gowalas and others) rose in a formidable revolt against the British colonial rule in 1855. 151 Th e rebellion was termed 'Hool' in Santal language. Th e Santal uprising was fi ercely Following another Santal unrest in 1871, it was decided that a rough land survey should be carried out in the Santal Parganas by a settlement offi cer untrammeled by detailed procedures. With this end in view the Regulation III of 1872 was passed. 157 However, the inevitable after-eff ect of the rebellion was that the Santals plunged into poverty and many of them moved into the Barind region of Bangladesh. As regards the Santal migration to Barind, the Census of India 1931 reported: "Th e Santals are spreading north and east, and the full eff ect of the movement is not exhausted in the districts that adjoin Santal Parganas, but makes itself felt even further way, in those parts of Dinajpur, Rajshahi and Bogra which share with Malda the elevated tract of quasi-laterite known as the Barind." 158 Th eir choice of Barind was infl uenced by the availability of cultivable land. Th e local landlords engaged the Santals in clearing jungle and levelling high lands. Th us, the Santals from Daman-i-koh settled here as poverty-stricken sharecroppers without any proprietary right in land but played an important role in the extension of agriculture in this region.
Th e Indigenous Peoples of Bangladesh
In the preceding pages we have discussed the historical profi les of three marginal communities in Bangladesh (hereinafter the profi led communities) aspiring to recognition as indigenous peoples. In this section we shall examine whether the characteristics of the profi led communities are commensurate with the criteria of the international defi nition of indigenous peoples. First, the historical profi les suffi ciently evidence that the profi led communities are comprised of peoples who are descendents of the earlier populations. Th ey have been living in their respective region from time immemorial. Th eir pre-colonial existence has been noted by earlier ethnographers in a number of books and scriptures. 159 Moreover, their present existence itself testifi es to the fact of their historical continuity with preinvasion and pre-colonial societies. Th at the profi led communities have a special historical tie with their respective territories has been suffi ciently adduced. For example, the Khasi peoples were closely associated with Jaintia which now forms part of Sylhet district of Bangladesh. 160 It is evident from the Moghul revenue records and the early written accounts of the East India Company that the Chakmas were among the original inhabitants of the Chittagong Hill Tracts region. 161 Th e Santals concentrated parts of the Hazaribagh district and Birbhum district of Bengal in the distant past. Later, they gradually scattered in the following districts: namely Bhagalpur, Santal Parganas, Birbhum, Bancura, Hazaribagh, Manbhum, Mednipur, Singbhum, etc. 162 Not only are the profi led communities distinct from the British colonialists or the majority Bengalis, they are distinguishable from each other. Each of the profi led communities has its own unique history, culture, tradition, religion, economy, social system, etc. For example, the Khasis have a matrilineal society. 163 Originally, the Khasis were animist or spirit worshippers. 164 Most of the Khasis in Bangladesh at present earn their livelihood by cultivating betel leaf. 165 Th e Santals are of the Dravidian race. 166 Th ey speak the Kolarian language which was found in Bengal including Santal Pargana and Northern Orissa. 167 Th e Santals are a patriarchal and agrarian community. 168 Th ough the Santal pantheon contains Th e subordination of the profi led communities began with subjugation of territory by the colonial authority and subsequent replacement of the old land administration and revenue system. Th ough experience diff ers among each of the profi led communities in respect of colonial domination, it is not impossible to outline a common and general pattern of colonial domination -which chiefl y includes military conquest, replacement of existing land administration, excessive revenue collection, etc. Colonial rule had upset the existing territorial and communal mapping of the sub-continent. Creation of new administrative units destroyed the earlier political boundaries to the detriment of territorial, political and communal integrity of the profi led communities. Colonial conquest followed by confi scation of land as well as introduction of new land tenure system threatened the socioeconomic structure of the profi led communities. As dispossession increased and traditional rights were constantly curtailed, the question of land rights became the primary focus of attention for the profi led communities. In addition, a noticeable geographical reorganization was brought about by means of reshaping the numeric size, concentration and dispersion of the profi led communities in their respective regions. Th e Khasis were driven away into the hills from the Surma basin during the British period. Th e Santals were given impetus to settle in Santal Pargana and later they migrated to the Barind region of Bangladesh. Th e Chakmas were encouraged to remain confi ned in the area called Chakma Circle. All these incidents subsequently played an important role in determining the political locus, economic and political disposition of the profi led communities.
In every respect, the profi led communities constitute the non-dominant sector as against the majority Bengalis. Th e history of the profi led communities epitomizes that depletion of the political and economic synergy of a community by way of external domination reduces them into non-dominant entities. At present, the situation concerning the profi led communities can be described as numerically inferior, 176 economically exploited, politically powerless, legally unprotected and victims of violence. 177 Moreover, the profi led communities have fallen victim to four principal threats; namely forced location, forced assimilation, militarization of their territories, and offi cial denial of recognition. 178 To off set this situation, the right to recognition as indigenous peoples, equality and self-determination, right to land, natural resources, cultural and intellectual property, economic rights, etc. are necessary. 179 Since the international legal regime of the indigenous peoples off ers a multicultural model of political ordering and incorporation of indigenous peoples into the fabric of the state, the marginal communities of Bangladesh under this regime will be able to join in the state mechanism in terms of equality, cultural integrity and not just individual citizenship. 180 And recently, the marginal communities including the profi led communities have begun to assert their demands for constitutional recognition, land rights, participation in political process, preservation of cultural integrity, equal opportunity with reference to human rights, self-determination, historic precedence and the international concept of indigenous peoples.
Conclusion
In British-India, the majority populations belonging to the Hindu and Muslim religions came out victorious in the struggle against colonialism and could organize themselves into states. However, the marginal communities who were unable to organize themselves into states at the time of decolonization for whatever reasons have found themselves engulfed in the nation-states. 181 Th e concept of Anaya said: "A corollary to focus on the colonial territorial unit was what became known as the 'blue water thesis' which developed eff ectively preclude from decolonization procedures consideration of enclaves of indigenous or tribal peoples living within the external boundaries of independent states" (footnote omitted indigenous peoples could prove to be immensely valuable in order to provide legal protection to the marginal communities against discrimination and racism as well as respecting cultural and other rights. Since the majority population of Bangladesh, i.e. Bengalis, has been able to form a state and has been in possession of sovereign political power to determine its own political rights and aspirations, it makes no sense to argue that the majority of Bengalis are indigenous in order to disapprove of the claim of marginal communities who are in actual need of such recognition to break through the chains of non-dominance. Th e sooner the government of Bangladesh realizes this, the better it will be for the citizens of Bangladesh.
